

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 06247 01 OF 02 101523Z

53

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6247

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL STAFF STUDY OF WARNING TIME

REF: A. USNATO 6093

B. USNATO 4527

C. USNATO 5730

D. USNATO 5938

SUMMARY: ON NOVEMBER 4, IS CIRCULATED DRAFT POSITION PAPER DPP/74/392(POUCHED), SUBJECT: WARNING TIME, AS BACKGROUND ON IS THINKING ON BOTH THIS SUBJECT AND ITS LINKS TO OTHER KEY ELEMENTS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE; NOTABLY DURATION OF HOSTILITIES, PRIORITIES, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES. PAPER STATES THAT IT IS ONLY FOR STAFF US AT NATO HEADQUARTERS. PAPER IMPLIES THAT SHORT WARNING TIMES DICTATE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PRIORITY TO STANDING FORCES, AND DENIAL OF RESOURCES TO FORCES THAT CANNOT BE BROUGHT INTO ACTION IN THE FIRST FEW  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06247 01 OF 02 101523Z

DAYS OF HOSTILITIES. MISSION CIRCULATED US COMMENTS TO DRC MEMBERS NOVEMBER 7. MISSION COMMENTS ARGUE FOR A BROADER RANGE OF POSSIBLE WARNING TIME, POSSIBLE BETTER USE OF WARNING TIME AND VALUE OF MOBILIZABLE AND REINFORCEMENT

FORCES. END SUMMARY.

1. IS DRAFT PAPER ON WARNING TIME CIRCULATED NOVEMBER 4 BEGINS BY DEFING TERMS, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN FOREWARNING AND WARNING OF WAR, USING MC-161 DEFINITION OF THE LATTER, AND DESCRIBING FOREWARNING AS WARNING RECEIVED DURING PERIODS OF TENSION. DRAFT DISTINGUISHES SHARPLY BETWEEN WARNING TIME AND PREPARATION TIME ON GROUNDS THAT TIME MUST BE ALLOWED FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION MAKING. DRAFT THEN REVIEW SELECTED PORTIONS OF MC-161 (PART I, SECTION 6) USING SAME FORECASTS FOR DAYS OF WARNING CONTAINED IN ORIGINAL IS MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE PAPER (REF B). DRAFT POINTS TO POSSIBLE DETERRENT EFFECT OF NATO COUNTERMOVES DURING THE WARNING PERIOD, BUT MAKES CLEAR THAT NATO PREPARATION CANNOT BEGIN UNTIL CONSULTATION AND DECISION MAKING HAVE TAKEN PLACE, WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TIME. DRAFT THEN CATALOGUES NATO STUDIES SINCE 1966 ON READINESS OF FORCES, POINTING OUT MALDEPLOYMENT, EXPECTED TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS, LACKOF RESERVE TRAINING AND LONG TIME REQUIRED FOR AUGMENTATION AND REINFORCEMENT FORCES TO ARRIVE IN-THEATRE (USING DPQ(71) AND (72) RESPONSES). DRAFT ALLUDES TO SACEUR BARRIER STUDY CONCLUSION OF REQUIREMENT FOR 11 DAYS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT CONVENTIONAL BARRIER PLANS, DISCUSSES LIMITATIONS OF THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM AND STATES EXPECTATION THAT AT LEAST 48 HOURS DELAY WILL FOLLOW POSITIVE WARNING OF WAR FOR FULL PROCESS OF CONSULTATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5. DRAFT STATES EXPECTATION THAT WP WOULD ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE DECISIVE MILITARY RESULT BEFORE ALLIANCE COULD MOBLIZE MILITARY RESOURCES, AND JUDGES THAT NATOS ABILITY TO WITHSTAND AN ATTACK WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING IS MORE QUESTIONABLE THAN NATOS ABILITY TO MOBILIZE, GIVEN THE TIME TO DO SO. DRAFT CONCLUDES:

(1) THE EMPHASIS IN NATO FORCES SHAOULD BE ON THOSE WHICH CAN BE IN THEIR GDP POSITIONS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, OR WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT INTO ACTION IN THE FIRST FIEW DAYS OF WAR.

(2) PRIORITY IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AND MAN-  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06247 01 OF 02 101523Z

POWER SHOULD BE GIVEN TO STANDING FORCES AND THOSE WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED EFFECTIVELY DURING THE LIKELY PERIOD OF AVAILABLE PREPARATION TIME.

(3) IN PARTICULAR, EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON:

(A) THE COMBAT READINESS, MANNING AND EQUIPMENT OF STANDING FORCES;

(B) THE READINESS AND AVAILABILTIY OF RAPID REACTION REINFORCEMENT FORCES;

(C) THE RAPIDITYOF FORWARD MOVEMENT INTO GDP POSITIONS;

(D) THE RAPIDITY OF MOVEMENT OF MOBILIZATION AND AUGMENTATION FORCES NEEDED TO BRING FORMATIONS AND UNITS UP TO WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH;

(E) THE MORE RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF BARRIER PLANS;

(F) MEASURES TO ENABLE NATO FORCES TO WITHSTAND AND SURVIVE THE INITIAL SHOCK OF ATTACK.

(4) CONVERSELY, NATO SHOULD NO LONGER DEVOTE RESOURCES TO FORCES AND CAPABILITIES WHICH IN ANY REALISTIC CALCULATION OF PREPARATION TIME ARE NOT LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ABILITY TO SUSTAIN A CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE BEYOND THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF HOSTILITIES.

(5) POLICY FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING SHOULD CONFORM TO THE SAME CRITERIA.

(6) ANY REVIEW OF THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM OR OF INDIVIDUAL ALERT MEASURES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TIME NECESSARY FOR CONSULTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN RELATION TO THE PERIOD OF WARNING LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE.

(7) MINISTERS SHOULD BE INVITED TO CONSIDER WHICH OF THE MEASURES OF THE ALERT SYSTEM THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE DURING A TENSION IN ADVANCE OF POSITIVE WARNING OF WAR. SUCH MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BOTH IN RELATION TO THE EFFECT THEY WOULD HAVE ON NATO'S PREPAREDNESS TO WITHSTAND AND SURVIVE ATTACK WHEN IT COMES, AND ALSO FOR THEIR DETERRENT EFFECT IN AN ESCALATING SITUATION.

(8) THE ATTENTION OF MINISTERS SHOULD BE DRAWN TO THE NECESSITY FOR URGENT DECISION MAKING IN TIME OF CRISIS, AND TO THE EFFECTS WHICH DELAYS IN THE TAKING OF SUCH DECISIONS WOULD HAVE ON NATO'S EVENTUAL ABILITY TO WITHSTAND ATTACK, BY MEANS OF THEIR PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN A REAL-TIME CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISE.

2. TEXT OF US REPLY AND SUMMARY OF COMMENTS FOLLOWS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06247 01 OF 02 101523Z

BEGINNING TEXT:

WE HAVE REVIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF DRAFT PAPER ON WARNING TIME AND BELIEVE IT PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE ELABORATION ON BASIC ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE (DRC/WP/74)4). OBVIOUSLY, TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE MANY SIGNIFICANT ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE PAPER. IT WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE MIXED REACTIONS TO BOTH ITS ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PAPER EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR IMPROVED USE OF WARNING TIME, WE FIND THE DISCUSSION AND ASSOCIATED CONCLUSIONS

(7 AND 8 ) USEFUL. WE BELIEVE THE MAIN EMPHASIS IN THE WARNING TIME DISCUSSIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON THIS PROBLEM. EACH ALLY, AS WELL AS NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, MUST PLAN IN ADVANCE FOR OPTIMAL USE OF WARNING TIMES AVAILABLE UNDER THE FULL SPECTRUM OF PLAUSIBLE SCENARIOS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06247 02 OF 02 101637Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6247

HOWEVER, WE DISAGREE WITH THE PAPERS CONCLUSIONS ON EMPHASIS FOR FORCE IMPROVEMENTS (CONCLUSIONS 1-5) , PARTICULARLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY NEGLECT NATOS ABILITY FOR A SUSTAINED DEFENSE. ASIDE FROM THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PAPER ADEQUATELY CONSIDERS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF PLAUSIBLE WARNING PREPARATION PERIODS, THE FACT REMAINS THAT LENGTH OF WAR IS NOT SOLELY DEPENDENT ON LENGTH OF WARNING TIME. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC FOR NATOS DEFENSE TO COLLAPSE FOR LACK OF SUSTAINING CAPABILITY.

THE US DISCUSSION PAPER ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE EMPHASIZES THE DESIRE OF THE US GOVERNMENT THAT NATO DEFENSE PLANNING TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL PLAUSIBLE SCENARIOS ON WARNING TIME AND DURATION OF WAR AND OFFERS SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN REASONABLY EXPECTED DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS.

I HAVE ATTACHED AN INFORMAL CRITIQUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06247 02 OF 02 101637Z

STAFF PAPER PREPARED BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AND AM TAKING THE LIBERTY OF DISTRIBUTING COPIES OF THIS LETTER TO OUR COLLEAGUES ON THE DRC.

ENCLOSURE-INFORMAL CRITIQUE

1. GENERAL. THE PAPERS EXCESS CONSERVATISM LEADS TO CONCLUSIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE A SELF FULFILLING PROPHECY, AS FOLLOWS:  
POOR INTELLIGENCE WARNING CAPABILITY (PARAS 6-8) PLUS TIMID

POLITICAL REACTION (PARAS 4, 8, SUMMARY G) EQUAL SHORT NATO MILITARY PREPARATION TIMES (PARAS 12, 13, 18) AND LATE START ON MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT (PARAS 14, 16, 17). THESE IN TURN PRODUCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION ONLY TO STANDING FORCES AND THOSE WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED EFFECTIVELY DURING THE LIKELY PERIOD OF AVAILABLE PREPARATION TIME. POSSIBLE RESULT WOULD BE : WARSAW PACT FULLY PREPARES FOR ATTACK; INTELLIGENCE NOTES AND REPORTS THESE PREPARATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY; POLITICAL LEADERS ACT SWIFTLY AND DECISIVELY; BUT NATO HAS ONLY STANDING AND A FEW RAPIDLY AVAILABLE FORCES LEFT TO FIGHT THE BATTLE\*

2. US VIEW (HOW TO AVOID THE SELF FULFILLING PROPHECY):

- A. BE REALISTIC ABOUT INTELLIGENCE WARNING CAPABILITIES.
- B. CAST ASIDE THE UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE POLITICAL TIMIDITY.
- C. RECOGNIZE THAT INTELLIGENCE WARNING, POLITICAL REACTION AND NATO COUNTER PREPARATIONS GO ON CONCURRENTLY.
- D. DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT NATO NEEDS TO PREPARE SUFFICIENTLY FOR A NUMBER OF PLAUSIBLE WP OPTIONS COMBINING ELEMENTS OF SURPRISE AND STRENGTH.
- E. APPLY SUFFICIENT RESOURCES ACCORDINGLY.

3. US ANALYSIS. THE KEY VARIABLES IN ANY CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THIS ISSUE ARE:

A. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY. HOW MUCH CAN INTELLIGENCE TELL US, AND HOW QUICKLY?

(1) WE THINK INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY WOULD BE GOOD. MC-161 POINTS OUT THAT WP WOULD HAVE TO DO MANY THINGS IT HAS NEVER DONE BEFORE SIMULTANEOUSLY; SUCH AS, REDEPLOY FORCES CLOSE TO THE BORDERS OF NATO, MOBILIZE IN NATO COUNTRIES, MOVE REINFORCEMENTS FORWARD FROM THE USSR, ENGAGE IN LARGE SCALE AIR AND NAVAL MOVEMENTS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06247 02 OF 02 101637Z

(2) WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND (AS DOES MC-161) THAT WP MILITARY PREPARATIONS ARE HIGHLY LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE IS PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR INDICATIONS OF SUCH PREPARATION.

B. INTELLIGENCE JUDGEMENT. HOW MUCH CAN INTELLIGENCE TELL US ABOUT WHAT ITS OBSERVATIONS OF WP PREPARATIONS PORTEND?

(1) WE AGREE THAT INTELLIGENCE PROBABLY CANNOT TELL US THAT WP DECISION TO ATTACK HAS BEEN MADE. SUCH AN INTELLIGENCE JUDGEMENT IS UNNECESSARY.

(2) WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS ACCUMULATE, AND THAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN CONCERNING WP PREPARATIONS BOTH FROM THE TOTAL NUMBER AND STRENGTH OF THE INDICATORS, AND FROM THE RATE AT WHICH THEY ARE DETECTED. MC-161 MAKES THE LATTER POINT VERY CLEARLY. FOR SCENARIOS INVOLVING SHORTER WP PREPARATION TIMES, THE RATE IS FASTER. WE FEEL THAT NATO REACTION WILL BE FASTER AS A RESULT.

C. POLITICAL REACTION. WHAT CHARACTER AND TIMING WOULD

ALLIED RESPONSE ASSUME?

(1) THE US FOR IT PART, WILL MOVE WHEN NECESSARY.

WE TOTALLY REJECT THE IDEA THAT THERE IS A "NATO DECISION TIME" WHICH INTERVENES BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE JUDGEMENT OF "CLEAR EVIDENCE OF IMPENDING ATTACK" AND THE START OF MEANINGFUL COUNTERPREPARATIONS.

(2) WE FEEL THAT EXPERIENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN EXPECTATION OF POLITICAL TIMIDITY, BUT THE OPPOSITE. US REACTED RAPIDLY AND STRONGLY TO PERCEIVED SOVIET PREPARATIONS DURING 1973 MID EAST CRISIS. OTHER EXPERIENCES (BERLIN, 1961, AND CUBA, 1962) SUPPORT THIS JUDGMENT.

(3) WE CANNOT AGREE TO CONCEPTUAL ANALYSES WHICH TREAT (A) INTELLIGENCE DETECTION OF WP PREPARATIONS, (B) DECISION MAKING AND CONSULTATION, AND (C) NATO COUNTER PREPARATIONS, AS TOTALLY SEPARATE ENTITIES IN TIME. IT IS USEFUL TO CONSIDER THESE SUBJECTS SEPARATELY TO DETERMINE OUR OWN CAPABILITIES. WHEN TIME IS CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE EVIDENT THAT ALL THREE ACTIVITIES GO ON CONCURRENTLY. OUR "PICTURE" OF THE IS ANALYSIS FOLLOWS: AFTER A PERIOD OF WP PREPARATIONS LASTING FROM 8 TO 12 DAYS THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES DELIVER A SEALED ENVELOPE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH DECLARES THAT THERE IS "CLEAR EVIDENCE OF IMPENDING ATTACK"; WHEREUPON THE ASTONISHED LUNS CALLS A MEETING OF TOTALLY UNINFORMED MEMBERS OF THE DPC, SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06247 02 OF 02 101637Z

WHO HEAR THE BAD NEWS AND REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS, FOLLOWED AT LEAST 48 HOURS LATER BY DPC ACTION AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ALLIED COUNTER-PREPARATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THAT SORT OF TREATMENT IS ABSURD, AND BENEATH THE DIGNITY OF MINISTERS TO DISCUSS IN PREPARATION FOR 1975 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE.

D. NATO COUNTER PREPARATIONS. WHAT IS OUR CAPABILITY TO MATCH THE WP BUILD UP?

(1) WE FEEL THAT NATO HAS A REAL CHANCE TO MATCH WP PREPARATIONS ON ANY LEVEL. THE INFORMATION LAID OUT IN DPC/D(73)- IS BASED ON DPQ(71) AND (72) RESPONSES, MAY BE OUT OF DATE, AND PROBABLY REFLECTS CONSERVATIVE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS.

(2) WE AGREE WITH SACEUR THAT THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM NEEDS STREAMLINING. WE REJECT THE VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT NATIONAL (OR EVEN ALLIED) COUNTER PREPARATIONS ARE IN ANY WAY DEPENDENT ON ITS FUNCTIONING.

(3) WHERE THERE ARE WEAKNESSES, WE SHOULD GIVE THEM EMPHASIS IN PRIORITIES PLANNING.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO FORCE PLANNING.

(1) WE SHOULD PREPARE FOR A VARIETY OF PLAUSIBLE SCENARIOS, FROM THOSE INVOLVING 48 HOURS OF WARNING TO THOSE WHICH ALLOW US THE MOST PREPARATION TIME.

(2) STANDING FORCES SHOULD RECEIVE THEIR SHARE OF RESOURCE EMPHASIS, AS SHOULD READILY MOBILIZABLE AND RAPID REINFORCEMENT FORCES. RESOURCES SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE

DEPRIVED TO FORCES WHICH TAKE LONGER TO MOBILIZE OR TO  
ARRIVE IN-THEATER, SINCE THESE FORCES ARE VITAL TO SUCCESS  
AGAINST A FULLY PREPARED WP ATTACK. END TEXT. MCAULIFFE

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